Competition as a savings incentive: A field experiment at a homeless shelter

This paper describes a randomized field experiment testing the impact of a savings competition on the behavior of homeless individuals staying at a transitional shelter. When monetary prizes were offered for achieving the highest saving rates within a particular month, average savings increased by $80 (a 30% increase in savings rate) while income and attendance at case management meetings remained unchanged. However, repeating the competition in the following month had no effect because responsive savers selected out of the shelter after the first month. In summary, while a savings competition can increase savings in the short run, its effect may be limited to the intensive margin and may diminish with repetition.

► We implemented a savings competition at a homeless shelter as a randomized field experiment. ► The competition increases savings by 30% ($80) in the first month. ► Competition does not increase income or attendance at case management. ► We see no evidence that repeating the competition in the following month has any effect. ► Saving at high rates appears to predict early exit from the shelter.