Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
883804 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2012 8 Pages PDF
Abstract

Giving in the dictator game has often been interpreted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. We suspect that giving is determined by subjects’ attempts to appear fair in the eyes of recipients and the experimenter. Therefore, we investigate behavior in the dictator game by using the randomized response technique to increase anonymity. Overall, 290 subjects participated in two experiments. The results demonstrate that the randomized response technique reduces giving to negligible amounts compared to the standard double blind condition. Thus, our results suggest that individuals closely follow egoistic motives in the dictator game when anonymity is convincingly implemented.

► We use the randomized-response technique to increase anonymity in the dictator game. ► Giving almost disappears if anonymity is implemented via RRT. ► Additionally, we control for the appropriateness of applying RRT.

Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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