Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
884033 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2010 22 Pages PDF
Abstract

Charities often devise fund-raising strategies that exploit natural human competitiveness in combination with the desire for public recognition. We explore whether institutions promoting competition can affect altruistic giving – even when possibilities for public acclaim are minimal. In a controlled laboratory experiment based on a sequential “dictator game” , we find that subjects tend to give more when placed in a generosity tournament, and tend to give less when placed in an earnings tournament – even if there is no award whatsoever for winning the tournament. Further we find that subjects’ experimental behavior correlates with their responses to a post-experiment questionnaire, particularly questions addressing altruistic and rivalrous behavior. Based on this evidence, we argue that behavior in our experiment is driven, in part, by innate competitive motives.

Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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