Travelers’ types

This paper uses subjects’ diverse self-reported justifications to explain discrepancies between observed heterogeneous behavior and the unique equilibrium prediction in a one-shot traveler's dilemma experiment. Principal components analysis suggests that iterative reasoning, aspiration levels, competitive behavior, attitudes towards risk and penalties and focal points may be behind different choices. Such reasons are coherent with same subjects’ behavior in other tests and experiments in which these particular issues are prominent, and thus, we identify “types” of subjects. Overall, we conclude that subjects’ self-justifications in complex strategic situations contain informational value which may be used to predict behavior in other situations of economic importance.

► There is a discrepancy between behavior and the Nash prediction in traveler's dilemma games. ► We use self-reported justifications of play to understand this discrepancy. ► Iterative reasoning, aspiration levels, rivalry, risk attitudes and focal points are relevant. ► We use principal component analysis and identify “types” of subjects. ► This procedure may be useful to predict behavior in other situations of economic importance.