Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
884139 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2010 11 Pages PDF
Abstract

Two collective action problems plague successful revolution. On the one hand, would-be revolutionaries confront a “participation problem,” whereby no rationally self-interested individual has an incentive to participate in rebellion. On the other hand, individuals face a “first-mover problem” whereby no rationally self-interested individual has an incentive to lead rebellion. This paper argues that 18th-century merchant sailors who confronted these problems devised a novel institution to facilitate maritime revolution and assist them in overthrowing abusive captains. This institution was called a “Round Robin.” Round Robins helped overcome both the participation and first-mover problems by aligning the interests of individual sailors desiring mutiny and restructuring the payoffs of leading versus following maritime rebellion.

Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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