Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
884525 | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 2008 | 6 Pages |
Abstract
In many cases, the cost of hiring an agent to acquire information is lower than the cost for the principal to perform that task. However, because of a difference in preferences between the principal and the agent, the principal often cannot fully utilize the agent’s expertise. This paper considers the cost of motivating the agent to acquire information and inducing him to report truthfully. The larger the private benefit, the greater is the cost of eliciting true information. At the same time, a private benefit may reduce the cost of motivating information acquisition. Thus, there are cases in which an agent with a different preference is desirable.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Kazumi Hori,