Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
884574 | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 2008 | 12 Pages |
Abstract
Asking responders in ultimatum bargaining for only minimal acceptable offers, implicitly assumes strategies to be monotonic. This assumption seems at odds with actual behavior. We report on a group experiment where 53 percent of the responders state non-monotonic strategies. Content analysis of the video-taped discussions show that social concern, non-expectancy of high offers, emotional, ethical, and moral reasons, group-specific decision rules and aversion against unpleasant numbers are main motives for rejecting advantageous offers. A control experiment with individuals not being observed also displays non-monotonic strategies. Our findings speak to reconsidering assumptions on the parameter space in models of inequity aversion.
Related Topics
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Authors
Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Zhu-Yu Li, Chaoliang Yang,