Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
933510 | Journal of Pragmatics | 2011 | 6 Pages |
Abstract
The author presents an argument against Radical Scepticism based on an insight into the semantic structure and properties of ‘doubt’, in particular, on the statement of self-contradictoriness of(i)* a doubts that p and a doubts that ∼p.Full-size tableTable optionsView in workspaceDownload as CSVIt appears that the Radical Sceptic must embrace, in just any finite statement of his/her doubt, the initial claim that s/he does know that s/he neither says that p nor says that ∼p and that s/he does say that s/he neither says that p nor says that ∼p.
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Authors
Andrzej Bogusławski,