What but-sentences argue for: An argumentative analysis of but

This paper discusses the semantics of the connective but. Two trends of analyses are compared: ones based on a notion of formal contrast and others that are inferential. First, the formal contrast approaches are evaluated with respect to a certain number of problematic examples. I argue that they encounter insurmountable issues, and that an inferential account is needed. However, the way the inference required in those latter accounts is drawn needs to be defined in a restricted way. I propose to use the probabilistic interpretation of the notion of argumentation to carry this out. It is argued that to be interpreted, but needs an argumentative goal that is debated by its conjuncts. In the absence of an explicit goal or one that can be deduced by world-knowledge, the goal must be abduced from the content of the but conjuncts alone by taking their information structure into account. My proposal for but is then shown to interact with that of other particles: too, only and yet.

► Approaches to ‘but’ based on purely formal contrast face severe empirical issues. ► To be adequate, an inferential theory of ‘but’ must clarify its inferential process. ► Probabilistic argumentation properly delimits the inferences considered by ‘but’. ► The argumentative treatment of ‘but’ is compositional with that of other markers.