Ancestral voices in the mammalian mind: Philosophical implications of Jaak Panksepp's affective neuroscience

The philosophical implications of Jaak Panksepp's affective neuroscience comprise a significant form of skepticism regarding our capacities as agents. This is clear in two ways. (1) Panksepp's methods of inquiry support a corollary to Dobzhansky's famous maxim concerning evolution: nothing in mammalian psychology makes sense except in light of ancient affective capacities shared by all mammals. The application of this maxim, I argue, raises informed doubts concerning our knowledge of our own capacities. (2) Against the backdrop of this maxim, Panksepp's substantive discoveries provide tentative confirmation of theories in psychology which raise doubts about our alleged capacity to give reasons for our actions. Taken together, Panksepp's methods and discoveries call into question the view we have of ourselves as free and responsible agents, while pointing us toward more-fruitful forms of inquiry concerning all our animal capacities, including our capacities for deliberation, choice, and action.