Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
9550856 | European Economic Review | 2005 | 12 Pages |
Abstract
In almost common-value auctions one bidder (the advantaged bidder) has a valuation advantage over all other (regular) bidders. It is well known that in second-price auctions with two bidders, even a slight private-value advantage can have an explosive effect on auction outcomes as the advantaged bidder wins all the time and auction revenue is substantially lower than in a pure second-price common-value auction. We explore the robustness of these results to the addition of more regular bidders in second-price auctions, and the extent to which these results generalize to ascending-price English auctions in an effort to provide insight into when and why one ought to be concerned about such slight asymmetries.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Dan Levin, John H. Kagel,