Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
9551733 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2005 | 15 Pages |
Abstract
We construct “simple” games implementing in Nash equilibria several solutions to the problem of fair division. These solutions are the no-envy solution, which selects the allocations such that no agent would prefer someone else's bundle to his own, and several variants of this solution. Components of strategies can be interpreted as allocations, consumption bundles, permutations, points in simplices of dimensionalities equal to the number of goods or to the number of agents, and integers. We also propose a simple game implementing the Pareto solution and games implementing the intersections of the Pareto solution with each of these solutions.
Keywords
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Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
William Thomson,