Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
9551750 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2005 | 38 Pages |
Abstract
We construct a relatively simple model of bidding with synergies and solve it for both open outcry and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. The essential behavioral forces involved in these auctions are: (1) A demand reduction force resulting from the monopsony power that bidders with multiple-unit demands have when synergies are relatively inconsequential, and (2) Bidding above stand-alone values in order to capture significant complementarities between units. The latter creates a potential “exposure problem,” as bidders may win only parts of a package and earn negative profits. Bidding outcomes are closer to equilibrium in clock compared to sealed-bid auctions. However, there are substantial and systematic deviations from equilibrium, with patterns of out-of-equilibrium play differing systematically between the two auction formats. These patterns of out-of-equilibrium play are analyzed, along with their effects on revenue and efficiency.
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Authors
John H. Kagel, Dan Levin,