Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
9554503 | Journal of Comparative Economics | 2005 | 12 Pages |
Abstract
Firms in socialist and transitional economies are often obliged to provide social goods at the same time that they are competing with private firms. This paper analyzes the impact of such bundling on the provision of private and social goods focussing on the inability of politicians to commit not to bail out firms experiencing financial trouble. This soft budget constraint problem results in firms not becoming efficient in the private goods market. We show that more competition in the private goods market can lead to less efficiency in such environments. As a potential solution to the soft budget constraint problem, we consider unbundling, i.e., the separation of social good provision from the private good, and analyze the benefits and the costs. Journal of Comparative Economics33 (1) (2005) 47-58.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Zhentang Zhang,