Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
956579 Journal of Economic Theory 2015 11 Pages PDF
Abstract

We provide a new, welfarist, interpretation of the well-known Serial rule in the random assignment problem, strikingly different from previous attempts to define or axiomatically characterize this rule.For each agent i   we define ti(k)ti(k) to be the total share of objects from her first k indifference classes this agent i   gets. Serial assignment is shown to be the unique one which leximin maximizes the vector of all such shares (ti(k))(ti(k)).This result is very general; it applies to non-strict preferences, and/or non-integer quantities of objects, as well.In addition, we characterize Serial rule as the unique one sd-efficient, sd-envy-free, and strategy-proof on the lexicographic preferences extension to lotteries.

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Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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