Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
956704 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2016 | 42 Pages |
Abstract
A three-stage market-game mechanism is devised that is simple (actions are quantities and outcomes are determined by arithmetic operations that do not depend on details of the economy) and achieves efficiency in a two-divisible-good, pure-exchange setting with potential information-aggregation. After an entry stage, agents make offers which are provisional for all but a small, randomly selected group. Then, those offers are announced, and everyone else makes new offers with payoffs determined by a Shapley–Shubik market game. For a finite and large number of players, there exists an almost ex post efficient equilibrium. Conditions for uniqueness are also provided.
Keywords
Related Topics
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Tai-Wei Hu, Neil Wallace,