Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
956705 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2016 | 29 Pages |
Abstract
In the repeated prisoner's dilemma there is no strategy that is evolutionarily stable, and a profusion of neutrally stable ones. But how stable is neutrally stable? We show that in repeated games with large enough continuation probabilities, where the stage game is characterized by a conflict between individual and collective interests, there is always a neutral mutant that can drift into a population that is playing an equilibrium, and create a selective advantage for a second mutant. The existence of stepping stone paths out of any equilibrium determines the dynamics in finite populations playing the repeated prisoner's dilemma.
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Authors
Julián García, Matthijs van Veelen,