Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
956731 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2013 | 16 Pages |
Abstract
Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [3] characterize preferences over menus of lotteries that can be represented by the use of a unique subjective state space and a prior. We investigate what would be the appropriate version of Dynamic Consistency in such a setup. The condition we find, which we call Flexibility Consistency, is linked to a comparative theory of preference for flexibility. When the subjective state space is finite, we show that Flexibility Consistency is equivalent to a subjective version of Dynamic Consistency and that it implies that the decision maker is a subjective state space Bayesian updater. Later we characterize when a collection of signals can be interpreted as a partition of the subjective state space of the decision maker.
Related Topics
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Authors
Gil Riella,