| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 956882 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2010 | 8 Pages |
Abstract
There are n agents who have von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions on a finite set of alternatives A. Each agent i 's utility function is known to lie in the nonempty, convex, relatively open set UiUi. Suppose L is a lottery on A that is undominated, meaning that there is no other lottery that is guaranteed to Pareto dominate L no matter what the true utility functions are. Then, there exist utility functions ui∈Uiui∈Ui for which L is Pareto efficient. This result includes the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem as a special case.
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Gabriel Carroll,