Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
956930 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2013 | 24 Pages |
Abstract
We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, we use Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, [5]) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a socially desirable outcome. We obtain two necessary conditions, Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability and show that the latter is satisfied as long as a particular zero-measure set of first-order beliefs is ruled out. In environments allowing small transfers of utility among agents, these two conditions are also sufficient.
Related Topics
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Authors
Georgy Artemov, Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano,