Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
956952 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2010 | 22 Pages |
Abstract
We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop is made by a committee and show that a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium exists given a log concave distribution of rewards. We compare search by committee to the corresponding single-agent problem and show that committee members are less picky and more conservative than the single agent. We show how (i) increasing committee size holding the plurality fraction constant and (ii) increasing the plurality rule affect the equilibrium acceptance threshold and expected search duration. Finally, we show that unanimity is optimal if committee members are sufficiently patient.
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Authors
James Albrecht, Axel Anderson, Susan Vroman,