Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
957112 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2011 | 27 Pages |
Abstract
Kidney exchange programs utilize both deceased-donor and live-donor kidneys. One of these programs, a two-way kidney paired donation (KPD), involves two patients exchanging their live donorsʼ kidneys. Another possibility is a list exchange (LE): a living incompatible donor provides a kidney to a candidate on the deceased-donor waitlist and in return the intended recipient of this donor receives a priority on the waitlist. By taking into consideration the fact that transplants from live donors have a higher chance of success than those from cadavers, we characterize the set of efficient and egalitarian exchanges involving the KPDʼs and LEʼs.
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Authors
Özgür Yılmaz,