Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
957133 Journal of Economic Theory 2009 31 Pages PDF
Abstract

A type structure is non-redundant if no two types of a player represent the same hierarchy of beliefs over the given set of basic uncertainties, and it is redundant otherwise. Under a mild necessary and sufficient condition termed separativity, we show that any redundant structure can be identified with a non-redundant structure with an extended space of basic uncertainties. The belief hierarchies induced by the latter structure, when “marginalized,” coincide with those induced by the former. We argue that redundant structures can provide different Bayesian equilibrium predictions only because they reflect a richer set of uncertainties entertained by players but unspecified by the analyst. The analyst shall make use of a non-redundant structure, unless he believes that he misspecified the players' space of basic uncertainties. We also consider bounding the extra uncertainties by the action space for Bayesian equilibrium predictions.

Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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