Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
957216 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2009 | 28 Pages |
Abstract
We explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions, but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others' responsiveness are heterogeneous. We study two substantively different ways of extending quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to this setting: (1) Heterogeneus QRE, where players share identical correct beliefs about the distribution of payoff responsiveness; and (2) Truncated QRE, where players have downward looking beliefs, systematically underestimating others' responsiveness. We show that the cognitive hierarchy model is a special case of Truncated QRE. We conduct experiments designed to differentiate these approaches. We find significant evidence of payoff responsive stochastic choice, and of heterogeneity and downward looking beliefs in some games.
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Authors
Brian W. Rogers, Thomas R. Palfrey, Colin F. Camerer,