Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
957297 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2011 | 20 Pages |
Abstract
We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin (1992) [1] shows that the pairwise single-crossing condition is sufficient for efficiency of the English auction with two bidders and suggests that it is also a necessary condition. This paper clarifies and extends Maskinʼs results to the case of N bidders. We introduce the generalized single-crossing condition—a fairly intuitive extension of the pairwise single-crossing condition—and prove that it is essentially a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium of the N-bidder English auction.
Related Topics
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Authors
Oleksii Birulin, Sergei Izmalkov,