Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
957300 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2011 | 17 Pages |
Abstract
We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [5], [6] and [7]). We show that this result does not extend to elections with more than two candidates. We study a class of simple scoring rules in voting games with Poisson population uncertainty and three candidates. No simple scoring rule aggregates information efficiently, even if preferences are dichotomous and a Condorcet winner always exists. We introduce a weaker criterion of informational efficiency that requires a voting rule to have at least one efficient equilibrium. Only approval voting satisfies this criterion.
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Authors
Johanna M.M. Goertz, François Maniquet,