Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
957314 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2009 | 31 Pages |
Abstract
We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Our theory permits issue preference; that is, agents may not be indifferent among gambles that yield the same probability distribution if they depend on different issues. Hence, we establish subjective foundations for the Anscombe–Aumann framework and other models with two different types of probabilities. We define second-order risk as risk that resolves in the first stage of the compound lottery and show that uncertainty aversion implies aversion to second-order risk which implies issue preference and behavior consistent with the Ellsberg paradox.
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Authors
Haluk Ergin, Faruk Gul,