Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
957429 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2010 | 20 Pages |
Abstract
We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom [20], and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes. We show that the bilateral substitutes condition is a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework. However, the set of stable allocations does not form a lattice under this condition, and there does not necessarily exist a doctor-optimal stable allocation. Under a slightly stronger condition, unilateral substitutes, the set of stable allocations still does not necessarily form a lattice with respect to doctors' preferences, but there does exist a doctor-optimal stable allocation, and other key results such as incentive compatibility and the rural hospitals theorem are recovered.
Keywords
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Social Sciences and Humanities
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima,