Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
957526 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2007 | 32 Pages |
Abstract
Ascending price auctions involving a single price path and buyers paying their final bid price cannot achieve the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) outcome in the combinatorial auctions setting. Using a notion called universal competitive equilibrium prices, shown to be necessary and sufficient to achieve the VCG outcome using ascending price auctions, we define a class of ascending price auctions in which buyers bid on a single price path. Truthful bidding by buyers is an ex post Nash equilibrium in such auctions. By giving discounts to buyers from the final price, the VCG outcome is achieved for general valuations.
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Authors
Debasis Mishra, David C. Parkes,