Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
957607 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2006 | 19 Pages |
Abstract
This paper introduces a class of coalitional games, called pillage games, as a model of Hobbesian anarchy. Any coalition can pillage, costlessly and with certainty, any less powerful coalition. Power is endogenous, so a pillage game does not have a characteristic function, but pillage provides a domination concept that defines a stable set, which represents an endogenous balance of power. Every stable set contains only finitely many allocations, and can be represented as a farsighted core. Additional results are obtained for particular games, including the game in which the power of each coalition is determined by its total wealth.
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Authors
J.S. Jordan,