Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
959025 | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | 2010 | 10 Pages |
Abstract
The paper analyzes the efficiency of extended producer responsibility (EPR) for waste management. We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly where endogenous market quality affects waste disposal costs. Each producer has to meet a take-back requirement that forces it to collect and treat the waste associated with its products. In line with reality, we assume that the producers either organize themselves individually or cooperate by setting up a producer responsibility organization (PRO). We study the various implementations of EPR. Central to the analysis is the trade-off between collusion through the PRO and market power in the waste industry.
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Authors
Pierre Fleckinger, Matthieu Glachant,