Dissecting the tragedy: A spatial model of behavior in the commons

Much of the discussion of the tragedy of the commons focuses on aggregate impacts, often in data-poor developing country settings. Few non-experimental empirical studies shed light on contextual circumstances driving the extent of rent dissipation and overexploitation. We utilize a high-resolution data set to estimate a behavioral model of fishermen's spatial choices. A unique policy setting allows us to measure the degree to which individual fishermen's choices appear aimed at mitigating the tragedy of the commons in a small numbers setting. We find evidence of partial mitigation in excess of what we would expect under pure self-interest but short of what would occur under group-maximizing behavior. We also examine how contextual factors in the fishery shape the degree of cooperation within the fishing season and find evidence that competition for the common pool resource distorts fishermen's implicit cost of distance—creating a form of “common property inertia”.

► We estimate a model of spatial fishing choice in a bycatch commons. ► Measure cooperation in bycatch avoidance using the shadow value of bycatch. ► Find evidence of some cooperation in bycatch avoidance but less than optimal. ► Find evidence that common property creates a form of spatial inertia.