Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
963307 | Journal of International Economics | 2006 | 36 Pages |
Abstract
An implication of the globalization hazard hypothesis is that 'Sudden Stops' caused by global financial frictions could be prevented by offering foreign investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees create a tradeoff, however, because they weaken globalization hazard while creating international moral hazard. We study this tradeoff using a quantitative, equilibrium asset-pricing model. Without guarantees, margin calls and trading costs cause Sudden Stops driven by a Fisherian deflation. Price guarantees prevent this deflation by propping up foreign demand for assets. The effectiveness of price guarantees, their distortions on asset markets, and their welfare implications depend critically on whether the guarantees are contingent on debt levels and on the price elasticity of foreign demand for domestic assets.
Keywords
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Authors
Ceyhun Bora Durdu, Enrique G. Mendoza,