| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 963491 | Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money | 2012 | 23 Pages |
Abstract
⺠Using novel proxies we examine the effect of information asymmetries among syndicate members on loan prices. ⺠When participant banks have information inferiority in comparison to arrangers they require higher loan spreads to compensate for possible arranger opportunistic behaviour. ⺠Repeat lending to the same borrower amplifies participant banks ability to assess credit risk and subsequent reduction in information asymmetries leads to lower loan spreads. ⺠These effects are amplified when borrowers are more opaque.
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Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Blaise Gadanecz, Alper Kara, Philip Molyneux,