Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
966598 | Journal of Monetary Economics | 2010 | 12 Pages |
Abstract
The set of incentive-feasible allocations is examined in a dynamic quasi-linear environment where agents lack commitment and have private information over their idiosyncratic characteristics. When record-keeping is available, the first-best allocation is implementable in a set of sufficiently patient economies. When record-keeping is limited to one money, this set is strictly smaller-except when private information is absent. When record-keeping is expanded, but limited to two monies, the set of economies for which the first-best is implementable corresponds to that of record-keeping, even when private information is present. We further demonstrate that two monies are a perfect substitute for record-keeping.
Related Topics
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Authors
Mei Dong, Janet Hua Jiang,