Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
969663 | Journal of Public Economics | 2016 | 13 Pages |
Abstract
Affirmative action bans can reduce black enrollment not only by reducing black admission advantages (contracting demand) but also by reducing applications (contracting supply) from black students who can still gain admission but prefer alternative schools that still practice affirmative action. When affirmative action was banned at UC law schools, Berkeley's black applications and enrollment declined by almost half even as black admission rates rose relative to whites. I ask whether black enrollment at UC law schools would have markedly declined even if black supply had not contracted. I find in a large sample of students applying to law schools nationwide that black supply contractions were driven mostly or entirely by students unlikely to gain admission under the ban, yielding stronger post-ban black applicant pools. Holding applicant pools constant, I estimate that the ban reduced black admission rates at both Berkeley and UCLA by half. Hence, black enrollment would likely have plummeted even if black supply had not contracted-as could occur under a nationwide ban that eliminates affirmative-action-practicing alternatives.
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Authors
Danny Yagan,