Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
969869 | Journal of Public Economics | 2009 | 10 Pages |
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of policymakers' horizon on the sustainability of international cooperation. We describe a prisoners' dilemma game between two infinitely-lived countries run by policymakers. We show that re-election incentives can act as a discipline device, making it easier to sustain cooperation between policymakers with finite but potentially renewable mandates than between infinitely-lived policymakers. We also show that, when voting suffers from a recency bias, policymakers may have incentives to “collude” to get re-elected and term limits may help international cooperation.
Keywords
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Paola Conconi, Nicolas Sahuguet,