Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
970477 | The Journal of Socio-Economics | 2009 | 6 Pages |
Abstract
Many resource users are not directly involved in the formulation and enforcement of resource management rules and regulations in developing countries. As a result, resource users do not generally accept such rules. An enforcement officer who has social ties with the resource users may encounter social disapproval and possible social exclusion from the resource users if he/she enforces the regulation zealously. The officer, however, may avoid this social disapproval by accepting bribes. In this paper, we present a simple model that characterizes this situation and derive results for situations where the officer is passively and actively involved in the bribery.
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Authors
Wisdom Akpalu, HÃ¥kan Eggert, Godwin K. Vondolia,