| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 972237 | Mathematical Social Sciences | 2013 | 6 Pages |
This paper characterizes the class of combinatorial auctions that have a particular form of Nash equilibrium. We refer to this class as Vickrey-reserve auctions. In such auctions, bidders pay at least their Vickrey–Clarke–Groves payments. A specific strategy profile studied by Bernheim and Whinston [Bernheim, B.D., Whinston, M., 1986. Menu auctions, resource allocation and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 1–31] is a Nash equilibrium of every Vickrey-reserve auction even in the presence of complementarities, and it implements an outcome in the bidder-optimal core.
► Combinatorial auction problem. ► “Vickrey-reserve auctions” require bidders to pay at least the Vickrey payments. ► Every Vickrey-reserve auction has the same Nash equilibrium in the core.
