| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 972329 | Mathematical Social Sciences | 2008 | 12 Pages |
Abstract
In this work we employ a simple axiom to provide three characterizations of the Owen value [Owen, G., 1977. Values of games with a priori unions. In: Henn, R., Moeschlin, O. (Eds.), Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Essays in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Springer Verlag, Nueva York, pp. 7688] without efficiency which are related to Owen's, Hart and Kurz's [Hart, S., Kurz, M., 1983. Endogenous formation of coalitions. Econometrica 51, 10471064] and Peleg's [Peleg, B., 1989. Introduction to the theory of cooperative games chapter 8 the Shapley value. RM 88 Center for Research in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory. The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel] characterizations of the Owen value.
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Physical Sciences and Engineering
Mathematics
Applied Mathematics
Authors
M.J. Albizuri,