Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
9724209 European Journal of Political Economy 2005 20 Pages PDF
Abstract
Foreign firms accused of dumping in the World Trade Organization (WTO) system may face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with domestic investigative authorities. The punitive tariffs are typically based on domestic firms' allegations, or so-called “facts available” dumping margins. This paper considers a number of questions relating to “facts available” dumping allegations. Given that governments' use of facts available margins are credible, why do foreign firms still sometimes choose not to cooperate? Furthermore, why do domestic firms, knowing that an administering authority might use their allegations to determine punitive duties, not always announce alleged dumping margins high enough to eliminate all imports? Is it always in the domestic firm's interests to force foreigners not to cooperate and thereby be “punished” with facts available margins? And what is the administering authority's optimal decision concerning compliance costs faced by foreign firms?
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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