Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
9724471 | International Journal of Industrial Organization | 2005 | 13 Pages |
Abstract
I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I show that there exists a unique efficient equilibrium within a particular class of trigger strategy equilibria. I then consider a series of comparative statics and extensions: (a) if for some exogenous reason one of the countries becomes more lenient towards mergers, than the other country becomes more lenient as well; (b) merger remedies increase the probability that a merger is approved and increase total welfare; (c) the effects of a merger wave are magnified by the equilibrium approval policy.
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Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
LuÃs M.B. Cabral,