Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
972592 The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 2015 20 Pages PDF
Abstract

•This theoretical paper examines the optimal allocation of collateral.•A borrower secures a long-term loan with collateral that incurs high information costs and has a strong learning effect.•A short-term loan has collateral that requires a small information investment.•The maturity of a loan ought to match the maturity of the collateral asset.

This paper studies loan collateral and relationship banking. A firm has different loans (e.g. short-term and long-term loans) and alternative collateral assets. How does it allocate the collateral assets between the loans? It optimally secures a long-term loan with collateral that incurs high information costs initially and has a strong learning effect during the loan period (e.g. accounts receivables). A short-term loan is secured with collateral that requires low information investment and has a weak learning effect (e.g. government bonds). It is optimal to secure long-term loans with long-term collateral and short-term loans with short-term collateral. If the loan period is short, unsecured lending may be optimal.

Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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