| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 972621 | Mathematical Social Sciences | 2014 | 7 Pages |
Abstract
•We formalize the concept of social welfare functions for matching markets.•Stability can involve a price in terms of other notions of social welfare.•We show some price tags are very very likely.•We also show that price tags can be substantial.
In two-sided matching markets, stability can be costly. We define social welfare functions for matching markets and use them to formulate a definition of the price of stability. We then show that it is common to find a price tag attached to stability, and that the price of stability can be substantial. Therefore, when choosing a matching mechanism, a social planner would be well advised to weigh the price of stability against the value of stability, which varies from market to market.
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Mathematics
Applied Mathematics
Authors
James W. Boudreau, Vicki Knoblauch,