Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
9726874 | Journal of Public Economics | 2005 | 27 Pages |
Abstract
Because of these distortions, it turns out that in a non-cooperative setting the second-best outcome might consist in the simultaneous adoption of a no-subsidy system. However, multiple equilibria typically exist and the second-best outcome is never a stable equilibrium. Other properties of the different possible equilibria are studied, as well as the impact of supra-national policies aimed at encouraging the development of international services. Finally, we show that the coordination problems deriving from the existence of multiple equilibria can, sometimes, be solved by separating the choice of a regulatory mode from the access pricing stage, thereby allowing the infrastructure managers to commit to use a specific financing system before setting the access price.
Related Topics
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Authors
Anna Bassanini, Jérôme Pouyet,