| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 972746 | Labour Economics | 2012 | 9 Pages |
We present a noncooperative model of a family's time allocation between work and a home-produced public good, and examine whether the income tax should apply to couples or individuals. While tax-induced labor supply distortions lead to overprovision of the public good, spouses' failure to internalize the collective effect of their choices points towards underprovision. A large parameter range exists for which a move from individual to joint taxation improves the welfare of both spouses. The source of Pareto-improvement consists in moving the level of the public good closer to its first-best, while an adjustment of intra-family transfers compensates the secondary earner for the increased tax load.
► We present a noncooperative model of a couple's work and home production decisions. ► We examine whether the income tax should apply to couples or individuals. ► A move from individual to joint taxation may improve the welfare of both spouses. ► The improvement consists in moving home production closer to the first-best level. ► Intra-family transfers compensate the secondary earner for the higher tax load.
