Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
972814 | Mathematical Social Sciences | 2007 | 24 Pages |
Abstract
In this paper we study the restriction, to the class of bargaining problems with coalition structure, of several values which have been proposed on the class of non-transferable utility games with coalition structure. We prove that all of them coincide with the solution independently studied in Chae and Heidhues [Chae, S., Heidhues, P., 2004. A group bargaining solution. Mathematical Social Sciences 48, 37–53] and Vidal-Puga [Vidal-Puga, J.J., 2005a. A bargaining approach to the Owen value and the Nash solution with coalition structure. Economic Theory 25, 679–701]. Several axiomatic characterizations and two non-cooperative mechanisms are proposed.
Keywords
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Physical Sciences and Engineering
Mathematics
Applied Mathematics
Authors
G. Bergantiños, B. Casas-Méndez, M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro, J.J. Vidal-Puga,