Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
973003 | Mathematical Social Sciences | 2010 | 8 Pages |
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate a model where, on a tree network, players collectively choose the location of a single public facility by noncooperative alternating-offer bargaining with the unanimity rule. We show the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and the characterization of stationary subgame perfect equilibria. We also show that the equilibrium location converges to the Rawls location (the Rawlsian social welfare maximizer) as the discount factor tends to 11; however, it does not relate to the Weber location (the Benthamite social welfare maximizer).
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Physical Sciences and Engineering
Mathematics
Applied Mathematics
Authors
Tomohiko Kawamori, Kazuo Yamaguchi,