Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
9731483 | The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance | 2005 | 13 Pages |
Abstract
This paper analyzes the global aspects of competition policy. The effects of a merger in the global marketplace will generally be asymmetric, and consequently lead to a bias in domestic merger decisions. In order to compare different policy regimes, we ascribe general objective functions to the respective authorities and employ a stochastic notion of mergers. We show that under the territoriality principle, the resulting global policy is too lax, whereas when domestic agencies assume extra-territorial powers the resulting policy is inefficiently strict. A global authority would achieve the first best outcome. The gains, however, would be distributed unevenly, which may explain the difficulty of instituting such an authority.
Keywords
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Abigail Tay, Gerald Willmann,