An axiomatic characterization of the position value for network situations

Network situations as introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) incorporate the influence of the architecture of a network rather than just the connectivity it provides and thereby provide a more flexible setting than communication situations, which consist of a game with transferable utility and a network. We characterize the position value for network situations along the lines of the characterization of the Shapley value by Shapley (1953). In contrast to previous attempts to provide such an axiomatization, we require no condition on the underlying network. The reason for this is that we exploit the additional flexibility of network situations.

► A value function provides a value for each possible network among players. ► The position value focuses on the contributions of links in generating value. ► We axiomatize the position value without the need to restrict to cycle-free graphs. ► We exploit the additional flexibility of network situations. ► Our axiomatization is along the lines of the original one of the Shapley value.